Democracy, Minority Rights and Conflict Prevention in Asia by Swain, Ashok - Autor/a
Democracy, Minority Rights and Conflict Prevention in Asia Titulo
 Swain, Ashok  - Autor/a; Autor(es)
Democratic Innovation in the South : Participation and Representation in Asia, Africa
and Latin America
En:
Buenos Aires Lugar
CLACSO Editorial/Editor
2008 Fecha
Colección Sur-Sur Colección
Conflicts; Minorities; Democracy; Civil society; Violencia; Conflictos; Minorias;
Democracia; Sociedad civil; Violence; Asia; 
Temas
Capítulo de Libro Tipo de documento
http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/clacso/sur-sur/20120321101342/15.swa.pdf URL
Reconocimiento-No comercial-Sin obras derivadas 2.0 Genérica
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/deed.es
Licencia
Segui buscando en la Red de Bibliotecas Virtuales de CLACSO
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar
Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO)
Conselho Latino-americano de Ciências Sociais (CLACSO)
Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO)
www.clacso.edu.ar
Part IV
Minority rights 
and Democracy

Ashok Swain*
Democracy, Minority Rights and 
ConflictPrevention in Asia
WHY	DO	DEMOCRACIES	ENCOUNTER	more	 violent	 secessionist	
movements	in	comparison	to	non-democracies?	While	there	is	eviden-
ce	that	democratic	states	contribute	to	international	peace,	the	con-
verse,	 that	democracies	enjoy	 internal	peace,	seems	problematic.	In	
fact,	the	evidence	seems	to	suggest	that	authoritarian	states	face	fewer	
separatist	challenges	of	a	violent	nature	than	do	democratic	ones.	De-
mocracy,	which	introduces	competitive	elections,	 is	commonly	offe-
red	as	a	solution	to	political	problems.	However,	in	ethnically	divided	
societies,	competitive	democracy	may	exacerbate	political	tension	and	
polarize	groups.	Are	systems	of	democratic	governance	incompatible	
with	durable	peace	in	such	societies?	This	work	examines	how	respect	
for	minority	rights	can	contribute	to	conflict	prevention	in	multi-cul-
tural	democracies	in	Asia.
Democracy, Peace and Conflict
Since	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	in	Europe,	the	notion	that	democracy	
is	the	ideal	form	of	government	has	almost	become	axiomatic,	though	
the	empirical	evidence	for	such	a	normative	conclusion	is	not	yet	de-
*	 Professor	of	Peace	and	Conflict	Research,	Uppsala	University,	SWEDEN.	Author	is	
grateful	to	Sabil	Francis	and	Erin	Mooney	for	their	research	support.
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finite.	 Closely	 related	 is	 the	 belief	 that	 a	 community	 of	 democratic	
nations	is	the	best	way	to	maintain	domestic	and	international	peace.	
There	 is	considerable	evidence	 for	 the	democratic	peace	 in	 interna-
tional	relations,	and	democracy,	or	the	promise	of	democratization,	
has	been	an	integral	component	in	several	peace	agreements	since	the	
end	of	the	cold	war,	that	have	ended	civil	conflict	within	nations.
In	 the	 last	 two	decades,	 several	countries,	 in	Asia,	Latin	Ameri-
ca,	and	Eastern	Europe,	have	become	democratic.	The	on-going	third	
wave	of	democratization	began	in	Southern	Europe	in	the	mid	970s,	
moved	on	to	Latin	America	and	Asia	in	the	90s,	and	in	the	990s,	
reached	sub-Saharan	Africa,	Eastern	Europe	and	 the	Soviet	Union.	
This	wave,	 rather	 tsunami,	of	democratization,	 like	previous	ones	 is	
not	a	smooth	and	straightforward	one.	Some	countries,	like	Pakistan	
and	Thailand	have	also	reverted	back	to	military	dictatorship.	The	in-
ternational	donor	community	is	committed	to	democracy,	most	impor-
tantly	by	promoting	civil	society.	This	commitment	may	have	suffered	
some	serious	handicaps	after	9-,	but	it	has	still	remained	the	main	
mantra	of	the	aid	agencies.	Implicit	in	the	literature	on	democracy	is	
also	the	idea	that	a	democratic	government	is	the	best	way	to	manage	
conflict,	 both	 internal	 and	 external.	 In	 fact,	 as	 Shapiro	 and	Cordon	
point	out,	“there	is	a	strong	propensity	to	associate	democracy	with	a	
wide	array	of	activities	and	outcomes	that	people	value.”4
Most	of	 the	 literature	on	democracy	assumes	that	 it	 is	 the	best	
form	of	government.	In	fact,	in	contemporary	popular	and	academic	
discourse	on	Afghanistan	and	Iraq,	the	mere	imposition	of	democracy	
was	prescribed	as	the	most	important	step	towards	peace.5	Theoreti-
	 	Russet,	Bruce,	Grasping the Democratic Peace	(Princeton	University	Press,	99);	
Wallensteen,	Peter,	Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global Sys-
tem,	London:	Sage	Publications,	00;	Spencer,	Weart,	Never at War: Why Don’t De-
mocracies Fight One Another?	New	Haven:	Yale	University	 Press,	 99;	 There	 are	
some	works,	 which	 are	 critical	 to	 this	 democratic	 peace	 concept:	 Bermer,	 Stuart	
A,	“Dangerous	Dyads:	Conditions	Affecting	the	Likelihood	of	Interstate	War,	6-
965”,	Journal of Conflict Resolution,	Vol.6,	No.	(99);	Babst,	Dean	and	William	
Eckhardt.	“How	Peaceful	Are	Democracies	Compared	With	Other	Countries,”	Peace 
Research	4	(99)	pp.	5-57;	Henderson,	Errol	A.,	Democracy and War: The End of 
an Illusion	(Lynne	Rienner	Publishers,	Boulder,	00).	
	 	Huntington,	Samuel,	“How	Countries	Democratize”	Political	Science	Quarterly	
06	(4)	99:	579-66.	Huntington,	Samuel,	The Third Wave: Democratization in the 
Late 20th Century	(Norman,	University	of	Oklahoma	Press,	99).
	 	Potter,	David	et	al.	Democratization	(Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	997).
4	 	Shapiro,	Ian	and	Casiano	Hacker	Cordon	(eds)	Democracy’s Value,	(Cambridge,	
Cambridge	University	Press,	999).
5	 	Goodson,	Larry	P,	“Afghanistan’s	Long	Road	to	Reconstruction”	Journal of De-
mocracy	-	Volume	4,	Number	,	January	00,	pp.	-9.
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cal	work	on	democratic	transition	and	democratization	has	also	em-
phasized	the	conflict	resolution	capacity	of	democracy.	Poe	and	Tate’s	
conclusion6	that	there	is	a	negative	relation	between	democracy	and	
the	level	of	repression	has	been	elaborated	in	several	works.7	In	con-
temporary	academic	and	popular	discourse,	the	idea	that	democracy,	
as	such,	rather	than	any	other	form	of	government,	is	the	best	way	to	
resolve	inter-state	conflicts	has	been	stressed.	According	to	Linz	and	
Stepan,	“democracy	has	become	the	only	game	in	town	when	no	signi-
ficant	political	groups	seriously	attempt	to	overthrow	the	democratic	
regime	or	secede	from	the	state.”9	
Several	theorists	have	also	extended	the	democratic	peace	thesis	to	
argue	that	a	“democratic	peace”	is	evident	within	intra-state	conflicts	
as	well.0.	 It	has	been	 reasoned	 that	democracy	 reduces	 the	 likeliho-
od	of	discrimination,	especially	of	ethno-political	minorities,	and	thus	
the	likelihood	of	political	repression.	However,	as	Errol	A.	Henderson	
points	out,	“the	democratic	peace	proposition”	has	not	been	explicitly	
tested	with	reference	to	third	world	post-colonial	states,	where	most	ci-
vil	wars	take	place.	In	recent	years,	research	has	attempted	to	explain	
why	the	new	democracies	have	not	been	able	to	benefit	from	the	values	
of	 democracy.	 Recently,	 Thomas	 Carothers	 argued,	 “Many	 countries	
6	 	Poe,	Steven	C.,	and	C.	Neal	Tate,	“Repression	of	Human	Rights	to	Personal	Integ-
rity	in	the	90s:	A	Global	Analysis,”	American Political Science Review,	vol.,	no.4:	
pp.5-7.
7	 	Henderson,	Conway,	“Conditions	Affecting	the	Use	of	Political	Repression”,	Jour-
nal of Conflict Resolution,	5:	99,	0-4;	Mitchell	Neil,	and	James	McCormick,	
“Economic	and	Political	Explanations	of	Human	Rights	Violations”;	World Politics	
40:	 476-9;	 Ziegenhagen,	 Eudard,	 The Regulation of Political Conflict	 (New	 York:	
Praeger,	96).
	 	Again,	there	is	criticism	of	the	idea	that	democratic	government	will	automati-
cally	bring	peace	but	this	remains	a	minority	view.	Pinkney,	Robert,	Democracy in 
the Third World,	Lynne	Rienner,	(Colorado,	Boulder:	00);	Reiter,	Dan,	“Why	NATO	
Enlargement	Does	Not	 Spread	Democracy”	 International Security,	 5,	 4	 (Spring),	
pp.4-67.	
9	 	Linz,	Juan	J	&	and	Alfred	Stepan,	Problems of Democratic Transition and Con-
solidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post Communist Europe	(Baltimore:	
John	Hopkins,	999),	p.	5.
0	 	Matthew,	Karin	and	Marissa	Myers.	997.	 ”Democracy	and	Civil	War:	A	Note	
on	the	Democratic	Peace	Proposition”,	International Interactions,	,	:	pp.09-;	
Rummel,	R.J,.	“Libertarian	Propositions	on	Violence	Within	and	Between	Nations:	A	
Test	Against	Published	Research	Results,”	The Journal of Conflict Resolution,	Vol.	9	
(95)	pp.	49-455.
	 	Gurr,	Ted,	ed.	Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict	(Wash-
ington	DC,	US	Institute	of	Peace,	99).
	Henderson,	Errol	A.,	Democracy and War: The End of an Illusion	(Lynne	Rienner	
Publishers,	Boulder,	00).
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that	policy	makers	and	aid	practitioners	persist	in	calling	“transitional”	
are	not	in	transition	to	democracy,	and	of	the	democratic	transitions	
that	are	under	way,	more	than	a	few	are	not	following	the	model.”
The	latest	contribution	to	the	debate	has	been	the	argument	that	
a	 new	 form	 of	 government,	 “semi-authoritarian4”	 has	 emerged	 in	
the	new	democracies	that	rose	in	the	third	wave	of	democratization,	
and	that	such	“semi-authoritarian”	states,	rather	than	representing	a	
transitory	phenomenon,	are	a	new	political	phenomenon	in	themsel-
ves.	Such	states	exhibit	the	characteristics	of	both	democracies	and	
authoritarian	 states.	 They	 combine	 rhetorical	 acceptance	 of	 liberal	
democracy,	the	existence	of	some	formal	democratic	institutions,	and	
respect	for	a	limited	sphere	of	civil	and	political	liberties	with	essentia-
lly	non-liberal	or	even	authoritarian	traits.	As	Ottaway	explains,	they	
“maintain	the	appearance	of	democracy	without	exposing	themselves	
to	the	political	risks	that	free	competition	entails.”5.
Others	have	termed	the	new	democracies	“pseudo-democracies”,	
“semi-democracies”,	or	“hybrid	democracies”.6	They	argue	that	such	
“semi-democracies”	are	more	prone	to	violence	than	authoritarian	or	
fully	consolidated	democratic	states,	which	have	been	conceptualized	
as	being	the	two	ends	of	the	democratic	spectrum.	Fein	argued	that	
the	most	 repressive	 states	are	 those	 that	exhibit	 intermediate	 levels	
of	 democracy,	 the	 “semi-democracies”,	 the	 idea	 that	 dominates	 the	
debate	 today.7	 Another	 explanation,	 similar	 to	 the	 “semi-authorita-
rian”	thesis,	is	that	there	has	been	that	a	“premature	closure”	of	the	
transition	process	–through	the	establishment	of	 formal	procedures	
	 	Carothers,	Thomas,	“The	End	of	the	Transition	Paradigm”	Journal of Democracy,	
Volume	,	Issue		(00)	pp.	5-.	Quote	in	page	6.	For	a	lively	debate	on	the	Transi-
tion	paradigm	see	Journal of Democracy	Volume	,	Issue		(00).	
4	 	Brumberg,	Daniel,	“Democracy	in	the	Arab	World?	The	Trap	of	Liberalized	De-
mocracy”	Journal of Democracy,	Volume	,	Number	4	October	00.	
5	 	Ottaway,	Marina	S.	Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism,	
Washington,	DC:	Carnegie	Endowment	 for	 International	Peace,	00.	Ottaway	ar-
gues	 that	 such	 regimes	abound	 in	 former	Soviet	 successor	 states	 like	Kazakhstan	
and	Azerbaijan,	 in	 sub-Saharan	Africa.	 In	 these	countries,	most	of	 the	multiparty	
elections	of	 the	990s	 failed	 to	produce	working	parliaments	or	other	 institutions	
capable	of	holding	the	executive	even	remotely	accountable.	Such	regimes	exist	in	
the	Arab	world,	in	the	Balkans,	and	in	Latin	America,	where	she	argues	that	Venezu-
ela	and	Peru	have	regressed	to	this	state	of	affairs.	In	Asia,	she	classifies	the	states	of	
Malaysia,	Singapore	and	Pakistan	as	“semi-authoritarian”	states.
6		Håvard,	Hegre,	et	al,	00.	“Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Political Change 
and Civil War, 1816-1992”,	 American	 Political	 Science	 Review,	 Vol.95,	 No.,	
March.
7	 	Fein,	Helen	“More	Murder	in	the	Middle:	Life	Integrity	Violations	and	Democ-
racy	in	the	World,	97”	Human Rights Quarterly	7,	:	70-9,	995.
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and	 institutions,	 before	 a	 real	 change	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 power–	 has	
taken	place.	However,	 these	explanations,	still	bypass	the	essential	
question,	as	to	whether	democracies	sharpen	or	lessen	ethnic	division	
by	conceptualizing	an	“ideal”	democracy,	and	then	trying	to	explain	
anomalies	that	rise	from	this.	Moreover,	the	“semi-authoritarian”	con-
ception,	while	 being	 an	 important	 contribution	 to	 the	 literature	on	
democracy,	does	not	explain	why	a	number	of	consolidated	democra-
cies,	 like	 India,	Turkey,	Sri	Lanka,	 Israel	or	even	 the	UK	and	Spain	
face	violent	separatist	challenges	within	their	state	borders.
Thus,	current	literature	has	focused	on	the	transition	paradigm,	
or	on	an	attempt	to	define	a	particular	democratic	polity	as	imperfect,	
while	keeping	the	ideal	of	democracy	intact.	Such	an	approach,	howe-
ver,	is	not	able	to	explain	a	crucial	point.	Why	have	democracies,	even	
consolidated	ones,	witnessed	violent	separatist	movements?	Countries	
that	are	mature	and	stable	democracies	–and	with	an	inclusive	form	
of	 society–	 such	as	 India,	have	even	 faced	several	 violent	 separatist	
challenges.	This	goes	against	the	prevailing	notion	of	the	co-relation	
between	democracy	and	internal	peace.	
Several	research	works	have	already	pointed	out	that	the	type	of	
political	system	sharply	affects	the	nature	of	protest	in	a	state.	The	de-
mocracies	are	supposed	to	have	more	extensive	but	less	deadly	protest	
than	the	autocracies.9	The	structure	and	ethos	of	democratic	regimes	
are	such	that	they	are	adjusted	to	respond	to	limited	challengers	in	a	
conciliatory	way,	which	reinforces	the	utility	of	protest	over	rebellion	
for	the	opposition	groups.	On	the	other	hand,	authoritarian	regimes	
generally	rely	more	on	coercive	control,	which	increases	the	relative	
utility	of	rebellion	for	challengers.	It	has	been	argued	that	the	extent	
of	political	 repression	depends	on	 the	 level	of	 threat	 faced	by	a	go-
vernment,0	and	that	democracies	repress	 less	as	 they	 face	different	
types	of	threats	when	compared	to	autocracies,	or	because	they	did	
	Ohlson,	 Thomas,	 and	 Soderberg,	Mimmi,	From Intra State War to Democratic 
Peace in Weak States,	 Uppsala	 Peace	 Research	 Papers	 Number	 5,	 Department	 of	
Peace	and	Conflict	Research,	Uppsala	University,	Sweden,	00,	p.5.
9	 	Gurr,	Ted	R.	“Why	Minorities	Rebel:	A	Global	Analysis	of	Communal	Mobiliza-
tion	and	Conflict	 since	945”	 International Political Science Review,	 vol.	4,	no.	,	
99;	Swain,	Ashok,	Social Networks & Social Movements: Are Northern tools Useful 
to Evaluate Southern Protests,	Uppsala	Peace	Research	Paper	No.	4,	00;	Zimmer-
mann,	Ekkart,	“Macro–Comparative	Research	on	Political	Protest”,	in	Ted	R.	Gurr,	
ed.,	Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research	(New	York:	Free	Press,	90),	
pp.	67-7.
0	 	Gartner,	Scott	S.	and	Patrick	M.	Regan,	“Threat	and	Repression:	The	Non	Linear	
Relationship	between	Government	and	Opposition	Violence”,	Journal of Peace Re-
search	:	,	7-,	996.
Democratic Innovation in the South
218
not	view	dissent	as	threatening	to	the	regime.	Ronald	A.	Francisco’s	
empirical	evaluation	of	the	relationship	between	coercion	and	protest	
in	three	coercive	states	(the	German	Democratic	Republic,	Czechos-
lovakia,	 and	 the	Palestinian	 Intifada)	finds	 that	 the	protesters	 react	
violently	to	extremely	harsh	coercion.	
It	is	true	that	democracies	have	not	faced,	in	general,	rebellions	
that	have	regime	change	as	their	aim,	but	rather	secessionist	move-
ments.	According	 to	 the	Uppsala	Conflict	Data	Project,	Russia,	Tur-
key,	India,	Indonesia,	Sri	Lanka,	Senegal,	Philippines	are	among	the	
democracies	that	faced	separatist	violence.	There	is	no	doubt	that	de-
mocracies	face	more	separatist	violence	than	non-democracies.	Even	
several	“mature”	democracies	are	facing	a	number	of	violent	separa-
tist	challenges	at	present	or	they	have	faced	in	the	recent	past.
Certainly,	there	is	a	“dearth	of	practical	advice	for	policy	makers	
on	 how	 to	 design	 and	 implement	 democratic	 levers	 that	 can	make	
peace	endure”.	It	is	important	to	closely	examine	why	democracies	
do	not	experience	rebellions	 for	 the	regime	change	but	at	 the	same	
time,	 they	have	been	 facing	 violent	 separatist	 conflicts.	A	 thorough	
research	undertaking	requires	evaluation	across	the	spectrum	of	non-
democratic,	semi-democratic,	or	democratic	states.	This	paper	tries	to	
examine	how	democratic	process	contributes	to	the	internal	conflict	
escalation	and	conflict	resolution,	particularly	in	Asia.	
Democracy and People
There	is	the	debate	between	whether	democracy	must	be	defined	in	
the	most	minimal	way,	or	if	it	should	be	defined	as	all	encompassing.	
One	of	the	most	basic	definitions	of	the	concept	has	been	the	minima-
list	definition	of	the	Italian	philosopher	Norberto	Bobbio,	that	demo-
cracy	is	in	essence,	the	replacement	of	the	power	of	persuasion	over	
that	of	force.4	As	he	put	it,	“What	is	democracy,	other	than	a	set	or	
	 	Davenport,	Christian,	“Human	Rights	and	the	Democratic	Proposition”,	Journal 
of Conflict Resolution,	4,	:	9-6,	999.
	 	Francisco,	Ronald	A.,	“The	Relationship	Between	Coercion	and	Protest:	An	Em-
pirical	Evaluation	in	Three	Coercive	States”	Journal of Conflict Resolution,	9:	(June	
995):6-.	However,	by	bringing	in	the	role	of	international	context	and	the	im-
portance	of	press	freedoms	and	information	flows,	Kurt	Schock	finds,	in	a	compara-
tive	study	of	the	Philippines	and	Burma,	the	excessive	repression	of	authority	might	
able	to	curb	the	popular	protest.	Schock,	Kurt,	“People	Power	and	Political	Opportu-
nities:	Social	Movement	Mobilization	and	Outcomes	in	the	Philippines	and	Burma”,	
Social Problems,	vol.	46,	no.	,	August	999,	pp.	55-75.
	 	Harris,	Peter	and	Reilly,	Ben(eds),,	Democracy and Deep Rooted Conflict: Options 
for Negotiators,	Stockholm:	International	IDEA	Handbook,	99.
4	 	Zolo,	Danilo,	Democracy and Complexity: A Realist Approach	(Polity:	Polity	Press,	
99),	p.	99.
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rules,	 for	 the	 solution	 of	 conflict	without	 bloodshed?”5	 The	 classic	
definition	by	Schumpeter6	was	that	democracy	was	merely	a	system	
in	which	rulers	were	selected	by	competitive	elections,	while	Popper7	
defined	it	as	a	means	by	which	people	removed	rulers	without	resour-
ce	to	force.	In	contrast	to	this	minimalist	expectation,	Dahl’s	concept	
of	“polyarchy”	asks	for	the	presence	of	elected	officials,	free	and	fair	
elections,	inclusive	suffrage,	the	right	to	run	for	public	office,	freedom	
of	 expression,	 existence	 and	 availability	 of	 alternative	 information,	
and	 associational	 autonomy,	 as	 essential	 to	 democracy.	 Diamond	
also	supports	Dahl’s	framework	in	his	work.9	
However,	in	democratic	states	that	face	violent	separatist	conflict,	
neither	 the	minimal	nor	 the	all-encompassing	models	seem	to	have	
the	desired	effect.	 In	other	words,	despite	 the	manner	 in	which	de-
mocracy	 is	 defined,	 there	 is	 a	 possibility	 of	 separatist	 conflict.	 And	
the	exact	definition	of	democracy	is	still	contested	in	many	transitory	
democracies	that	face	numerous	challenges	such	as	the	need	for	po-
pular	legitimacy,	the	shallow	roots	of	democratic	values,	weak	party	
systems,	organized	 factional	 interests	and	complicated	electoral	 ru-
les.	Such	systems	also	struggle	with	the	customization	of	politics,	the	
decentralization	 of	 state	 power,	 the	 introduction	 of	mechanisms	 of	
direct	democracy,	judicial	reform,	the	alleviation	of	poverty,	and	eco-
nomic	stabilization,	to	name	just	a	few	of	the	trials	that	they	face.0	
Przeworski	argues	that	majoritarian	politics	do	not	converge	on	com-
mon	interests,	in	modern	polities,	and	that	elections	do	not	represent	
the	general	will.	Democracy	can	be	defined	as	a	system	where	 the	
government	is	in	power	by	the	consent	of	the	people	and	the	gover-
nment	is	accountable	to	the	governed.	All	these	are	crucial,	and	the	
denial	of	one	of	these	leads	to	a	crisis	of	legitimacy	of	the	state.	In	fact,	
5	 	Shapiro,	Ian	and	Casiano	Hacker	Cordon	(eds)	Democracy’s	Value,	(Cambridge,	
Cambridge	University	Press,	999),	p.	.
6	 	Schumpeter,	Joseph	A.,	Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy	(New	York:	Harper	
&	Brothers,	94).
7	 	Popper,	Karl,	The Open Society and its Enemies	(London:	Routledge	and	Kegan	
Paul,	96).
	 	Dahl,	Robert	A.,	Preface To Democratic Theory	 (Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	
Press,	956).
9	 	 Diamond,	 Larry	Developing Democracy- towards consolidation	 (John	Hopkins	
University	Press,999).
0	 	Schedler,	Andreas,	“What	is	Democratic	Consolidation?”	Journal of Democracy	
9.	(99)	9-07.
	 	Przeworski,	Adam,	Minimalist	Conception	of	Democracy:	A	Defense”	in	Ian	Sha-
piro	and	Casiano	Hacker	Cordon	(eds)	Democracy’s Value,	(Cambridge,	Cambridge	
University	Press,	999).
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the	policies	followed	by	several,	which	consistently	held	recourse	to	
the	argument	that	democracy	meant	majority	rule	in	refusing	to	cons-
titutionally	guarantee	minority	rights,	put	the	minority	in	a	position	
closely	comparable	to	the	subjects	of	arbitrary	power.
In	 recent	years,	 there	 is	 a	growing	 interest	 to	apply	 the	 “inclu-
sion”	approach	while	doing	democratic	auditing	of	a	particular	sta-
te.4	This	approach	has	been	pioneered	by	Young5,	who	fashions	the	
concept	 of	 “deep	democracy”	 arguing	 that	most	 democracies	 today	
are	 plebiscite	 democracies,	 in	which	 “candidates	 take	 vague	 stands	
on	a	few	issues,	citizens	endorse	one	or	another,	and	then	have	little	
relation	 to	 the	policy	process	until	 the	next	 election”.6	As	 she	puts	
	 	O’Brien,	Conor	Cruise,	“Terrorism	under	Democratic	Conditions:	The	Case	of	the	
IRA”.	Chapter	5,	pp.	9-04	 in:	Crenshaw,	Martha	(ed)	9.Terrorism, Legitimacy, 
and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence.	Wesleyan	University	Press,	Mid-
dletown,	Connecticut.	Roeder	argues	for	institutional	guarantee	of	minority	rights	
against	 a	 predatory	majority	 in	 a	 democracy.	 Arguing	 against	 the	 power	 sharing	
arrangements,	he	advocates	in	favor	of	divided	power	arrangements	that	are	more	
likely	to	deter	the	escalation	of	ethnic	crisis	 to	ethno	national	crisis.	Philip	Power	
G.	Roeder,	 “Dividing	as	an	Alternative	 to	Ethnic	Power	Sharing”,	Paper	presented	
at	the	00	Annual	Meeting	of	the	International	Studies	Association,	Portland	Hill,	
Portland,	Oregon,	February	6-March	,	00
	 	For	criticism	on	the	inclusive	democracy	thesis,	see	Roemer,	John.	E	“Does	De-
mocracy	engender	 justice?”	00,	Discussion	Paper	0-0,	University	of	Copenha-
gen.	Department	of	Economics	(formerly	Institute	of	Economics),	pp.56-;;	Maskin,	
Eric,	and	Partha	Dasgupta	and	“Democracy	and	Other	goods,”	pp.	69	to	90,	in	Ian	
Shapiro	 and	 Casiano	Hacker	 Cordon	 (eds)	Democracy’s Value,	 (Cambridge,	 Cam-
bridge	University	Press,	999).	
4	 	Recent	research	has	focused	on	how	democracy	can	be	defined,	and	measured.	
Among	the	questions	that	have	been	raised	are	if	democracies	be	measured	objec-
tively,	and	can	they	ranked	as	mature,	transition,	and	lacking?	Beetham,	David	(ed),	
Defining and Measuring Democracy,	Sage	Modern	Political	Series,	Volume	6,	(Sage	
Publications	New	Delhi	994).	On	the	other	handsome	others	argue	that	democracy	
cannot	be	easily	measured,	as	 the	 theoretical	 conception	of	democracy	cannot	be	
operationalized	as	it	is	extremely	multi-dimensional.	Elklit,	Jorgen,	“Is	the	Degree	of	
Electoral	Democracy	Measurable?	Experiences	from	Bulgaria,	Kenya,	Latvia,	Mon-
golia,	and	Nepal,	David	Beetham	(ed),	Defining and Measuring Democracy,	Sage	Mod-
ern	Political	Series	Volume	6,	 (Sage	Publications	New	Delhi	994);	Haynes,	 Jeff,	
Democracy in the Developing World: Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East	
(Polity:	Cambridge,	00).
5	 	 Iris	Marion	Young,	 ed.,	 Inclusion	 and	Democracy	 (Oxford:	Oxford	University	
Press,	000).	Among	other	theorists	of	this	approach,	which	in	essence	can	be	defined	
as	the	idea	that	anyone	who	is	affected	by	a	decision	should	have	a	say	in	the	tak-
ing	of	that	decision,	are:	Dennis	Thompson	and	Amy	Gutmann,	Democracy and Dis-
agreement (Cambridge,	Massachusetts:	Harvard	University	Press,	996);	Christiano,	
Thomas,	The Rule of the Many	(Boulder,	Colorado,	Westview	Press,	996).	
6	 	 Iris	Marion	Young,	 ed.,	 Inclusion	 and	Democracy	 (Oxford:	Oxford	University	
Press,	000),	p.	5.
221
Ashok Swain
it,	 “The	 normative	 legitimacy	 of	 a	 democratic	 decision	 depends	 on	
the	 degree	 to	which	 those	 affected	 by	 it	 have	 been	 included	 in	 the	
decision	making	process	and	have	had	 the	opportunity	 to	 influence	
the	outcomes.”	Klare,	for	example,	has	suggested	a	definition	of	a	new	
“post	liberal”	conception	of	democracy,	one	that	is	“more	egalitarian,	
participatory,	and	environmentally	sensitive.”7
If	such	a	broadening	is	possible,	then	does	such	an	approach	have	
relevance	 in	countries	 such	as	 India,	Sri	Lanka,	Philippines,	Thailand	
and	Indonesia?	Is	the	lack	of	inclusion,	or	a	perceived	feeling	of	exclusion	
the	root	cause	of	alienation,	that	is	then	expressed	in	terms	of	a	separatist	
violent	struggle?	If	this	is	the	case,	then	how	can	it	be	approached?	
Democracy and Minority Challenges
Democracy,	which	introduces	competitive	elections,	is	commonly	offe-
red	as	a	solution	to	political	problems.	However,	as	Przeworski	points	
out	 elections	may	not	 represent	 the	will	 of	 all	 population	 groups.	
Several	countries	consistently	argue	that	majority	rule	renders	cons-
titutionally	guaranteed	minority	rights	unnecessary.	For	example,	in	
Sri	Lanka	or	Turkey	a	minority	has	been	denied	all	participation	in	the	
democratic	process,	other	than	voting	and	being	automatically	outvo-
ted.	There	are	several	countries,	like	these	two,	that	refuse	to	follow	
international	human	rights	standards,	subjecting	minorities	to	arbi-
trary	power	by	a	predatory	majority.9	 In	a	democracy,	 the	majority	
has	the	ability	to	abuse	its	electoral	power	against	the	minority	or	to	
elect	a	government	that	imposes	laws	and	mores	of	one	religion.40
Diversity	 poses	 significant	 challenges	 for	 democratic	 politics.	
History	plays	an	important	role	in	shaping	this	diversity.	Most	of	the	
7	 	Klare,	Karl	“Legal	Theory	and	Democratic	reconstruction:	Reflections	on	99”	
in	G.S.	G.Skapska	(eds),	Alexander	A Fourth Way,	New	York	and	London:	Routledge,	
994.
	 	Przeworski,	Adam,	Minimalist	Conception	of	Democracy:	A	Defense”	in	Ian	Sha-
piro	and	Casiano	Hacker	Cordon	(eds)	Democracy’s Value,	(Cambridge,	Cambridge	
University	Press,	999).
9	 	O’Brien,	Conor	Cruise.	9.	‘Terrorism	under	Democratic	Conditions:	The	Case	
of	the	IRA.’	In	Martha	Crenshaw	(ed.),	Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Conse-
quences of Political Violence. Middletown,	CT:	Wesleyan	University	Press.;	Roeder,	
Philip	G.	005.	‘Power-Dividing	as	an	Alternative	to	Ethnic	Power-Sharing.’	In	Philip	
G.	Roeder	and	Donald	Rothchild	(eds),	Sustainable Peace: Democracy and Power Di-
viding Institutions after Civil Wars.	 Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press;	Swain,	Ashok	
(ed.).	005.	Education as Social Action: Knowledge, Identity and Power.	Houndmills	
and	New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan	and	UNRISD.	
40	Clemens,	Walter	C.	Jr.	00.	‘Complexity	Theory	As	A	Tool	For	Understanding	and	
Coping	With	Ethnic	Conflict	and	Development	Issues	in	Post-Soviet	Eurasia.’	Inter-
national Journal of Peace Studies,	vol.	7,	no.	,	pp.	-5.
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post-colonial	 states	 face	 the	 absence	of	 consensus	 on	 their	 nation-
hood	due	 to	 their	 colonial	masters’	 construction	 and	politicization	
of	 the	diversity	 to	keep	 them	in	power.	Democracy	 is	also	 inheren-
tly	difficult	 in	ethnically	or	culturally	 segmented	societies	as	 it	can	
encourage	zero-sum	political	behavior,	particularly	by	 the	majority	
group.4	Thus	as	Sisk	argues:	“Minorities,	particularly,	equate	demo-
cracy	not	with	freedom	or	participation	but	with	the	structured	do-
minance	of	adversarial	majority	groups.”4	This	may	explain	why	a	
number	of	well-established	democracies	as	well	as	countries	engaged	
in	a	transition	process,	face	violent	challenges	from	minority	groups	
within	state	borders.	It	shows	an	inherent	weakness	in	democracies,	
that	majority	rule	is	not	necessarily	friendly	to	or	understanding	of	
minorities	and	their	desires	and	needs.4	This	does	not	mandate	an	
abandonment	of	democracy,	but	it	suggests	that	efforts	at	democrati-
zation	should	be	guided	by	the	realization	that	it	is	a	conflict-driven	
process	which	may	 exacerbate	 inequalities	 and	 encourage	 affected	
groups	 to	pursue	 insurgency.44	 Institutionalized	power	 sharing	me-
chanisms,	for	example,	may	offer	incentives	for	cooperation	between	
ethnic	groups.45	
At	 the	 same	 time	we	need	 to	 take	 into	account	 that	 increasing	
ethnic	diversity	does	not	undermine	democracy	per	se.	Some	argue	
that	it	is	likely	that	a	high	level	of	ethnic	fragmentation	can	actually	
4	 	Reilly,	Benjamin.	00.	Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for 
Conflict Management.	 Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press:	 Reilly,	 Benjamin.	
00.	 ‘Electoral	Systems	 for	Divided	Societies.’	 Journal of Democracy,	 vol.	 ,	no.	
;	Varshney,	Ashutosh.	00.	 ‘Ethnic	Conflict	and	Civil	Society:	India	and	beyond.’	
World Politics,	vol.	5,	no.	,	6-9.
4	Sisk,	Timothy	D.	996.	Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Con-
flict.	New	York:	Carnegie	Commission	on	Preventing	Deadly	Conflict	&	Washington,	
DC:	United	States	Institute	of	Peace,	p.	.
4	 	Alfredsson,	Gudmundur	and	Danilo	Turk.	99.	 ‘International	Mechanisms	for	
the	Monitoring	and	Protection	of	Minority	Rights:	Their	advantages,	disadvantages	
and	interrelationships.’	In	Monitoring Human Rights in Europe: Comparing interna-
tional procedures and mechanisms.	Dordrecht:	Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers;	Ottaway,	
Marina	S.	00.	Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism.	Washing-
ton,	DC:	Carnegie	Endowment	for	International	Peace.
44	 	Henderson,	Errol	A.	00.	Democracy and War: The End of an Illusion.	Boulder:	
Lynne	Rienner	Publishers.
45		 Hartzell,	 Caroline	 and	Mattew	 Hoddie.	 00.	 Institutionalizing Peace: Power 
Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management.	Berkely,	Los	Angeles	and	London:	
University	of	California	Press.;	Hartzell	et	al.	(00);	Lijphart,	Arend.	977.	Democ-
racy in Plural Societies.	New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press;	Sisk,	Timothy	D.	996.	
Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflict.	New	York:	Carnegie	
Commission	on	Preventing	Deadly	Conflict	&	Washington,	DC:	United	States	Insti-
tute	of	Peace.	
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help	democratic	consolidation	if	no	group	has	the	capacity	to	control	
power	alone.46	
The	ideals	that	shape	democracy,	which	has	become	the	favored	
system	of	modern	state	rule,	are	supposed	to	make	it	the	best	option	
for	ethnic	minority	protection	and	preservation	of	their	identity.	The	
rising	prominence	of	minority	rights	and	identity	has	required	a	fun-
damental	shift	of	focus	for	democracies	to	try	and	accommodate	these	
groups	in	the	best	possible	manner.
Despite	 its	 imperfect	 nature,	 democratic	 system	 seems	 to	 offer	
the	most	promising	situation	for	minorities.	The	most	common	grie-
vance	of	any	ethnic	group	is	the	inability	to	be	heard,	but	a	functio-
ning	democracy	usually	allows	for	the	opportunity	of	all	members	to	
have	a	voice.	As	Amartya	Sen	notes,	“the	right	to	freedom	of	speech	
is…the	precondition	 for	having	 any	other	 rights	 at	 all.”47	 In	 a	non-
democratic	set	up,	this	is	impossible.	The	expression	of	political	de-
mands	as	made	available	in	most	democracies	does	allow	for	dissent	
and	some	organized	structure	for	group	conflict.	It	can	be	argued	that	
some	variations	of	democracy	are	more	successful	in	accommodating	
minorities	than	others.	
Democracy	 is	a	delicate	plant	 that	 thrives	only	 if	 the	soil	 is	ca-
refully	 cultivated.	Good	 governance	 is	 necessary	 for	 the	 survival	 of	
democratic	values,	meaning	equal	opportunities	for	participation	by	
all,	vibrant	civil	society,	transparency,	accountability	and	the	rule	of	
law.	The	legitimacy	of	a	democratic	process	depends	on	the	degree	to	
which	those	affected	by	it	have	been	included	in	the	decision	making	
process	and	have	had	the	possibility	to	influence	the	outcomes.	A	dy-
namic	and	structured	civil	society	can	hold	governments	accountable	
and	can	form	the	basis	of	a	democracy.	However,	democracy	is	a	re-
cent	visitor	to	many	parts	of	Asia	and	it	is	a	bit	early	to	get	an	appro-
priate	audit	of	the	democratic	development	in	the	region.	
Democracies and Separatist Violence in Asia
For	new	Asian	democracies,	it	is	a	major	challenge	to	establish	how	the	
minority	population	can	be	integrated	while	guaranteeing	respect	for	
their	group	rights	as	well	as	individual	rights	in	the	democratic	con-
solidation	process,	in	order	to	further	strengthen	the	internal	peace,	
stability	and	security.	Making	the	problem	worse	for	these	emerging	
democracies,	which	have	been	conceptualized	as	being	between	the	
46	Reilly,	Benjamin.	000.	‘Democracy,	Ethnic	Fragmentation,	and	Internal	Conflict.’	
International Security,	vol.	5,	no.	,	pp.	6-5.
47	 	Amartya	Sen,	‘Human	Rights	and	Economic	Achievements,’	in	Bauer	and	Bell,	
The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, 9.
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two	ends	of	the	democratic	spectrum,	research	in	recent	years	shows	
that	they	are	more	prone	to	ethnic	violence	than	authoritarian	or	fu-
lly	 consolidated	 democratic	 states.4	 Especially	 in	 transitory	 demo-
cracies,	communal	groups	have	opportunities	for	mobilization,	while	
at	the	same	time	the	state	lacks	resources	and	strong	institutions	to	
reach	the	kinds	of	accommodation	typical	 for	established	democra-
cies.49	As	a	result,	in	countries	like	the	Philippines	and	Indonesia	the	
transition	process	is	facing	periodic	closures.	Democracy	has	already	
been	replaced	by	military	dictatorship	in	Thailand.
The	regular	disturbances	on	the	path	of	democratic	consolidation	are	
further	complicating	the	relationship	between	the	ethnic	groups	and	
the	state.	Democratically	elected	leaderships	in	these	countries	are	sti-
ll	weak	and	are	trying	to	establish	full	control	over	the	state	power.	In	
their	quest	for	power,	they	try	to	follow	the	strategy	of	confrontation	
rather	than	the	policy	of	accommodation	as	the	‘tough’	stance	against	
the	minority	challenge	gets	the	approval	of	the	majority	community.	
This	policy	helps	in	the	electoral	competition	as	it	has	been	clearly	de-
monstrated	in	recent	elections	in	Thailand,	Indonesia	and	Sri	Lanka.	
However,	 the	 weak	 democratic	 regimes,	 unlike	 their	 authoritarian	
4	 	Hegre,	Håvard,	Tanja	Ellingsen,	Scott	Gates,	and	Nils	Peter	Gleditsch.	00.	‘To-
ward	a	Democratic	Civil	Peace?	Political	Change	and	Civil	War,	6-99.’	American 
Political Science Review,	vol.	95,	no.	.
49	 	Ibid.
Table 1
Asian Democracies and Minority Violence
Country Democratic Score:
Freedom House 2006
Democratic Score: 
Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2007
Violent Demand for 
Statehood by Minorities 
(UCDP) 2005 
India Free Flawed Democracy
(rank 35)
Assam - Kashmir 
Manipur - Nagaland
Indonesia Free Flawed Democracy
(rank 65)
Aceh
Philippines Partly Free Flawed Democracy
(rank 63)
Mindanao
Sri Lanka Partly Free Flawed Democracy
(rank 57)
Eelam
Thailand Partly Free Hybrid regimes
(rank 90)
Patani
Source: www.pcr.uu.se, www.freedomhouse.org, www.economist.com.
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predecessors	or	counterparts,	are	not	capable	of	enforcing	complete	
control	over	the	newly	mobilized	minorities.	Results	from	the	00-
00	East	Asia	Barometer	Survey	show	that	the	respondents	in	East	
Asian	democracies	 covered	by	 the	 survey,	 including	 the	Philippines	
and	Thailand,	overwhelmingly	prefer	democracy	to	authoritarianism	
as	a	regime,	but	when	it	comes	to	norms	and	processes,	many	of	them	
have	yet	to	shed	their	authoritarian	habits	and	mindsets.50
Indian Experience
It	is	very	difficult	to	definitely	conclude	as	to	why	India,	despite	being	
a	strong	and	stable	democracy	is	facing	several	separatist	violent	con-
flicts.	In	prima	facie,	India	seems	to	be	a	country	where	the	“democra-
tic	peace	proposition”	for	internal	peace	seems	to	have	failed.	Howe-
ver,	in	spite	of	hosting	a	number	of	violent	secessionist	movements,	
India	has	established	a	consolidated	democracy.	With	the	help	of	its	
democratic	institution,	it	has	been	able	to	bring	peaceful	and	lasting	
solutions	 to	 several	minority	challenges:	Sikhs	 in	Punjab,	Tamils	 in	
India,	and	Gorkhas	in	West	Bengal	to	name	a	few.
India	has	always	been	a	surprise	for	theorists	of	democracy.	It	has	
consistently	defied	 those	who	prophesied	 its	 imminent	demise.5	 In	
spite	of	a	fissiparous	society	and	considerable	socio-economic	challen-
ges,	including	abject	poverty,	widespread	illiteracy,	and	a	deeply	hie-
rarchical	social	structure,	all	of	which,	in	theory,	are	uncongenial	for	a	
flourishing	democracy,	India’s	democracy	shows	no	signs	of	withering	
away.	Most	analysts	agree	that	crucial	to	the	survival	of	democracy	in	
India	has	been	the	nature	of	the	Indian	state,	and	its	willingness	to	
bargain	and	accommodate	varying	interests.	This	has	been	seen	as	key	
in	maintaining	the	democratic	system	despite	the	deep	divisions	in	so-
ciety.	In	the	most	radical	of	these	approaches,	Lijphart5,	for	example,	
has	 insisted	 that	 India	fits	neatly	 into	 the	consociational	paradigm,	
though	it	does	not	seem	to	be	so	at	first	glance,	and	even	though	the	
consociational	system	has	not	been	formally	enshrined	in	the	Indian	
50	 	East	Asia	Barometer	Surveys	00-00.	Data	analyzed	by	Chull,	Doh	and	Jason	
Wells.	005.	‘Is	Democracy	the	only	Game	in	Town?’	Journal of Democracy, vol.	6.	
no.	,	pp.	-0.
5	As	the	country	went	to	the	polls	for	the	second	time	in	957,	Selig	Harrison,	in	
an	oft	quoted	remark,	said,	“the	odds	are	wholly	against	the	survival	of	freedom…in	
fact,	the	issue	is	whether	any	Indian	state	can	survive	at	all,”	India: The Most Danger-
ous Decades	(Princeton,	960),	p.	.	
5	 	Arend	Lijphart,	“The	Puzzle	of	Indian	Democracy:	A	Consociational	Interpreta-
tion”,	The	American	Political	Science	Review,	Vol.	90,	No.	.	(Jun.,	996),	pp.	5-
6.	Also,	Lijphart,	Arend.	977.	Democracy in Plural Societies.	New	Haven:	Yale	Uni-
versity	Press.
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polity.	He	argues	that	Indian	democracy	has	displayed	all	four	crucial	
elements	of	power-sharing	theory,	which	are:	(a)	grand	coalitions	that	
include	representatives	of	all	major	groups	(b)	cultural	autonomy	for	
these	 groups	 (c)	 proportionality	 in	 political	 appointments	 and	 civil	
service	posts	(d)	a	minority	veto	with	regard	to	vital	minority	rights	
and	autonomy.	
These	may	at	first	glance	seem	a	rebuttal	of	the	majority	system,	
or	the	“winners	take	all	system”,	with	concentration	of	power	in	bare	
one	party	majority	governments,	centralized	power,	a	disproportio-
nal	 electoral	 system,	 and	 absolute	majority	 rule,	 that	 has	 charac-
terized	 the	 Indian	 political	 system.	However,	 Lijphart	 argues	 that	
the	federal	arrangements	in	which	states	and	linguistic	boundaries	
largely	coincide,	the	rights	of	religious	and	linguistic	minorities	to	
have	autonomous	schools	are	protected,	and	the	existence	of	sepa-
rate	“personal	laws”	for	the	minorities,	make	India	a	good	case	for	
the	consociational	system.	Though	Lijphart’s	argument	has	been	cri-
ticized5,	what	is	important	in	the	Indian	system,	is	the	willingness	
to	compromise.	Bargaining	is	crucial	to	this	process.	Kanti	Bajpai,54	
for	example,	argues	that	the	Indian	package	to	deal	with	ethnic	rela-
tions,	has	consisted	of	three	main	elements:	(a)	a	political	order	mar-
ked	by	 liberal	 constitutionalism,	 state	backed	secular	nationalism,	
and	 state	 led	 social	modernization	and	economic	development	 (b)	
power	sharing	in	terms	of	group	rights	and	the	devolution	of	autho-
rity	to	ethnic	based	lower	levels	of	government,	and,	finally,	coercion	
and	force	if	the	first	two	failed.	
Within	the	democratic	framework,	it	is	possible	to	follow	an	in-
clusive	model	like	the	consociational	model.	What	is	important	is	that	
democracy per se is not the means to conflict resolution, as majoritaria-
nism, again a crucial component of democracy, can be used to exacer-
bate ethnic conflict. As	Lipjhart	points	out,	“the	most	serious	obstacle	
to	power	sharing	in	divided	societies	is	the	presence	of	a	solid	majo-
rity	that,	understandably,	prefers	pure	majority	rule	to	consociationa-
lism”.	 It	 is	extremely	 important	 to	establish	a	democratic	state	 that	
appropriately	accommodates	the	ethnic	and	religious	diversity	of	the	
country.	Yet	such	concessions	have	kept	many	modern	states	unified	
and	democratic	in	the	face	of	possible	succession.
5	 	For	an	explicit	and	complete	rejection	of	the	consociational	theory	with	regard	
to	India	see	Paul	R.	Brass,	The Politcs of India Since Independence	(Cambridge:	Cam-
bridge	University	Press,	99)	pp.	4-4.
54	Kanti	 Bajpai,	 “Diversity,	 Democracy	 and	 Devolution	 in	 India”,	 in	 Michael	 E.	
Brown	and	Sumit	Ganguly,	eds.,	Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia 
and the Pacific	(Cambridge:	MIT	Press,	997),	pp.-.
227
Ashok Swain
Concluding Remarks
In	recent	times	there	has	been	a	greater	recognition	of	‘group	rights’	
and	as	such	the	responsibility	of	the	state	to	offer	special	treatment	
and	protection	of	the	minorities,	as	opposed	to	blanket	individual	rig-
hts	to	all	citizens	of	the	state.	Yet	the	intriguing	question	is	how	a	ba-
lance	can	be	achieved	between	protecting	the	notion	of	the	individual	
and	the	sovereign	state,	whilst	not	neglecting	a	minority,	which	most	
often	has	valid	claims	to	special	recognition.	Equality	before	the	law	
does	not	necessarily	equate	to	equality	for	all	people.
Granting	greater	group	rights	to	minorities,	or,	often	enough,	just	
adhering	 the	procedures	and	 legislation	 that	already	exist	 is	almost	
enough	to	prevent	ethnic	conflict	from	breaking	out	in	a	democracy.	
Self-identity,	some	form	of	self-rule	and	pride	go	a	long	way	to	em-
powering	minorities.	The	lack	of	a	voice	is	perhaps	the	greatest	grie-
vance	of	minorities,	which	includes	recognition	of	the	special	nature	
of	their	people,	culture	and	language.	Not	ensuring	such	opportuni-
ties	 for	minorities,	whether	 it	 is	manifested	 through	 economic	 dis-
crimination,	communal	violence	or	elsewhere	is	the	peril	of	ignoring	
such	concessions.
In	order	to	achieve	their	best	interests,	and	as	such	prevent	mino-
rity	opposition,	the	political	system	of	the	nation-state	is	most	impor-
tant.	A	mature,	stable	democracy	represents	the	best	chance	for	mino-
rities	to	achieve	the	education,	health,	economic	status	and	religious	
freedom	that	prevent	them	from	enacting	their	frustrations	through	
violence.	Furthermore,	such	a	system,	with	its	established	institutions	
and	‘healthy’	civil	society	most	often	sees	minority	protest	in	the	form	
of	non-violent	marches	or	actions,	which	is	also	best	for	the	state.	New	
democracies,	that	is,	those	nations	with	a	short	history	of	democracy	
are	 the	 states	 that	 are	most	 vulnerable	 to	minority	 ethnic	 violence.	
Such	a	system	allows	for	the	gathering	of	minorities	who	can	plan	in-
surrection,	but	also	is	a	system	without	the	strong	institutions	to	grant	
concessions	and	cope	with	dissent.	However,	the	old	democracies	if	
they	lack	flexible	approach	to	address	minority	issue,	may	also	face	
violent	 opposition	 from	minority	 communities.	 The	 conflict	 in	 Sri	
Lanka	is	a	good	example	of	this.	In	the	case	of	India,	the	democratic	
institutions	have	helped	to	bring	peaceful	solutions	to	several	violent	
minority	movements	by	accommodating	various	demands.	Where	the	
accommodation	policy	has	failed,	conflict	still	continues	as	it	has	been	
in	the	case	of	Kashmir.
Violence	as	a	solution	to	minority	concerns	only	takes	place	un-
der	certain	circumstances.	A	state	that	will	not	allow	a	minority	voice	
allows	for	problems	to	be	bottled	up,	to	potentially	become	explosive	
in	the	form	of	ethnic	violence.	There	are	numerous	solutions	propo-
Democratic Innovation in the South
228
sed	in	improving	minority	situations,	and	also	in	dealing	with	mino-
rity	violence.	Each	minority	group	is	unique	in	its	own	way.	Although	
each	 strategy	 has	 its	merits,	 there	 are	 certainly	 common	 elements.	
There	needs	to	be	institutional	variations	within	each	country’s	demo-
cracy,	 regarding	electoral	 laws,	 timing	of	 elections,	drawing	of	pro-
vincial	boundaries	and	choice	between	majoritarian	or	consociatio-
nal	structures.	Such	decisions	need	to	be	made	to	include	minorities	
to	create	a	system	that	suits	the	unique	situation	of	each	individual	
country.	More	 often	 than	not,	 in	 a	 democracy	 the	 legislation	 exists	
for	all	manner	of	minority	concerns;	the	problem	is	making	it	more	
streamlined	and	more	accessible	to	those	who	need	it	most.	Greater	
recognition,	cooperation	and	conciliation,	using	all	 the	available	fa-
cilities	would,	more	often	than	not	solve	most	of	the	problems.	It	is	
necessary	that	the	loser	of	an	election	believes	that	their	group	rights	
will	be	protected	and	that	there	will	be	an	opportunity	in	the	future	for	
electoral	 success.	Where	systematic	abuse	exists	and	 is	perpetuated	
by	an	all-powerful	group,	the	international	community	has	a	greater	
responsibility	to	ensure	that	the	existing	legislation	is	followed,	and	
that	there	are	repercussions	for	not	doing	so.
Bibliography
Alfredsson,	Gudmundur	and	Danilo	Turk	(99).	“International	
Mechanisms	for	the	Monitoring	and	Protection	of	Minority	
Rights:	Their	advantages,	disadvantages	and	interrelationships”,	
in	Monitoring Human Rights in Europe: Comparing international 
procedures and mechanisms. Dordrecht:	Martinus	Nijhoff	
Publishers.
Babst,	Dean	and	William	Eckhardt	(99).	“How	Peaceful	Are	
Democracies	Compared	With	Other	Countries”,	Peace Research, 
4,	pp.	5-57.
Bajpai,	Kanti	(997).	“Diversity,	Democracy	and	Devolution	
in	India”,	in	Michael	E.	Brown	and	Sumit	Ganguly	(eds.),	
Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific. 
Cambridge:	MIT	Press.
Brass,	Paul	R.	(99).	The Politics of India Since Independence. 
Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.
Beetham,	David	(ed.)	(994).	Defining and Measuring Democracy. 
New	Delhi:	Sage	Publications.
Bermer,	Stuart	(99).	“Dangerous	Dyads:	Conditions	Affecting	the	
Likelihood	of	Interstate	War,	6-965”,	Journal of Conflict 
Resolution,	6	().	
Brumberg,	Daniel	(00).	“Democracy	in	the	Arab	World?	The	
229
Ashok Swain
Trap	of	Liberalized	Democracy”,	Journal of Democracy,		(4),	
October.
Carothers,	Thomas	(00).	“The	End	of	the	Transition	Paradigm”,	
Journal of Democracy,		(),	pp.	5-.
Christiano,	Thomas	(996).	The Rule of the Many. Boulder,	CO:	
Westview	Press.
Clemens,	Walter	C.	Jr.	(00).	“Complexity	Theory	As	A	Tool	
For	Understanding	and	Coping	With	Ethnic	Conflict	and	
Development	Issues	in	Post-Soviet	Eurasia”,	International 
Journal of Peace Studies, 7	(),	pp.	-5.
Dahl,	Robert	A.	(956).	Preface To Democratic Theory. Chicago:	
University	of	Chicago	Press.
Davenport,	Christian	(999).	“Human	Rights	and	the	Democratic	
Proposition”,	Journal of Conflict Resolution,	4	(),	pp.	9-6.
Diamond,	Larry	(999).	Developing Democracy - towards 
consolidation. Johns	Hopkins	University	Press.
Elklit,	Jorgen	(994).	“Is	the	Degree	of	Electoral	Democracy	
Measurable?	Experiences	from	Bulgaria,	Kenya,	Latvia,	
Mongolia,	and	Nepal”,	in	David	Beetham	(ed.),	Defining and 
Measuring Democracy. New	Delhi:	Sage	Publications.
Fein,	Helen	(995).	“More	Murder	in	the	Middle:	Life	Integrity	
Violations	and	Democracy	in	the	World,	97”,	Human Rights 
Quarterly	7	(),	pp.	70-9.
Francisco,	Ronald	A.	(995).	“The	Relationship	Between	Coercion	
and	Protest:	An	Empirical	Evaluation	in	Three	Coercive	States”,	
Journal of Conflict Resolution,	9	(),	June,	pp.	6-.
Gartner,	Scott	S.	and	Patrick	M.	Regan	(996).	“Threat	and	
Repression:	The	Non	Linear	Relationship	between	Government	
and	Opposition	Violence”,	Journal of Peace Research,		(),	pp.	
7-.
Goodson,	Larry	(00).	“Afghanistan’s	Long	Road	to	
Reconstruction”,	Journal of Democracy, 4	(),	January,	pp.	-
9.
Gurr,	Ted	(ed.)	(99).	Minorities at Risk: A Global View of 
Ethnopolitical Conflict.	Washington	DC:	US	Institute	of	Peace.
---------------	(99).	“Why	Minorities	Rebel:	A	Global	Analysis	of	
Communal	Mobilization	and	Conflict	since	945”,	International 
Political Science Review, 4	().
Harris,	Peter	and	Ben	Reilly	(eds.)	(99).	Democracy and 
Deep Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators. Estocolmo:	
International	IDEA	Handbook.
Democratic Innovation in the South
230
Harrison,	Selig	(960).	India: The Most Dangerous Decades. 
Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press.
Hartzell,	Caroline	and	Matthew	Hoddi	(00).	Institutionalizing 
Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management. 
Berkeley,	Los	Angeles	and	London:	University	of	California	
Press.
Håvard,	Hegre,	Tanja	Ellingsen,	Scott	Gates	and	Nils	Peter	Gleditsch	
(00).	“Toward	a	Democratic	Civil	Peace?	Political	Change	and	
Civil	War,	6-99”,	American Political Science Review, 95	(),	
March.
Haynes,	Jeff	(00).	Democracy in the Developing World: Africa, Asia, 
Latin America, and the Middle East. Cambridge:	Polity	Press.
Henderson,	Conway	(99).	“Conditions	Affecting	the	Use	of	Political	
Repression”,	Journal of Conflict Resolution,	5,	pp.	0-4.
Henderson,	Errol	(00).	Democracy and War: The End of an Illusion. 
Boulder,	CO:	Lynne	Rienner	Publishers.
Huntington,	Samuel	(99).	“How	Countries	Democratize”,	Political 
Science Quarterly,	06	(4).
Huntington,	Samuel	(99).	The Third Wave: Democratization in the 
Late 20th Century.	Norman,	University	of	Oklahoma	Press.
Klare,	Karl	(994).	“Legal	Theory	and	Democratic	reconstruction:	
Reflections	on	99”,	in	Skąpska,	Graąyna	and	Gregory	S.	
Alexander	(eds.),	A Fourth Way. New	York	y	London:	Routledge.
Lijphart,	Arend	(977).	Democracy in Plural Societies. New	Haven:	
Yale	University	Press.
Lijphart,	Arend	(996).	“The	Puzzle	of	Indian	Democracy:	A	
Consociational	Interpretation”,	The American Political Science 
Review, 90	(),	June,	pp.	5-6.
Linz,	Juan	and	Alfred	Stepan	(999).	Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, 
and Post Communist Europe. Baltimore:	John	Hopkins.
Maskin,	Eric	and	Partha	Dasgupta	(999).	“Democracy	and	Other	
goods”,	in	Ian	Shapiro	y	Casiano	Hacker	Cordon	(eds.),	
Democracy’s Value. Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.	
Matthew,	Karin	and	Marissa	Myers	(997).	“Democracy	and	Civil	
War:	A	Note	on	the	Democratic	Peace	proposition”,	International 
Interactions,		()	pp.	09-.
Mitchell,	Neil	and	James	McCormick	(9).	“Economic	and	
Political	Explanations	of	Human	Rights	Violations”,	World 
Politics,	40,	pp.	476-9.
O’Brien,	Conor	Cruise	(9).	“Terrorism	under	Democratic	
231
Ashok Swain
Conditions:	The	Case	of	the	IRA”,	in	Crenshaw,	Martha	(ed.),	
Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences of Political 
Violence. Middletown,	CT:	Wesleyan	University	Press.
Ohlson	and	Soderberg	(00).	From Intra State War to Democratic 
Peace in Weak States. Sweden:	Uppsala	Peace	Research	Papers	
N°5,	Departamento	de	Investigaciones	sobre	Paz	y	Conflicto,	
Uppsala	University.
Ottaway,	Marina	S.	(00).	Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-
Authoritarianism.	Washington,	DC:	Carnegie	Endowment	for	
International	Peace.
Pinkney,	Robert	(00).	Democracy in the Third World. Boulder,	CO:	
Lynne	Rienner.
Poe,	Steven	C.,	and	C.	Neal	Tate	(994).	“Repression	of	Human	
Rights	to	Personal	Integrity	in	the	90s:	A	Global	Analysis”,	
American Political Science Review, 	(4),	December,	pp.	5-7.
Popper,	Karl	(96).	The Open Society and its Enemies. Londres:	
Routledge	and	Kegan	Paul.
Potter,	David	et	al.	(997).	Democratization. Cambridge:	Polity	Press.	



